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ABSTRACT
This paper reports results for a class of dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium models with credit
constraints that can account for some of the empirical regularities of the Sudden Stop phenomenon
of recent emerging markets crises. In these models, credit constraints set in motion Irving Fisher's
debt-deflation mechanism and they bind as an endogenous equilibrium outcome when agents are
highly indebted. The quantitative predictions of these models yield three key lessons: (1) Sudden
Stops can occur as an endogenous response to typical realizations of adverse shocks to fundamentals,
in environments in which agents plan their actions taking credit constraints and expectations of
Sudden Stops into account. (2)  Credit constraints cause output declines during Sudden Stops when
collateral constraints limit debt to a fraction of the market value of capital, when there are limits on
access to working capital, or when debt-deflation lowers the value of the marginal product of factors
of production. (3) The debt-deflation mechanism has significant quantitative effects in terms of the
amplification, asymmetry and persistence of the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to standard
shocks, and in the occurrence of Sudden Stops as infrequent events nested within regular business
cycles. Precautionary saving rules out the largest Sudden Stops from the stochastic stationary state,
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* 
The “Sudden Stop” phenomenon of the recent emerging markets crises is one of the key new 
questions facing International Macroeconomics. Sudden Stops are defined by unusually large recessions 
marked by: sharp, abrupt current account reversals, large contractions in output and absorption, and 
collapses in goods and asset prices. In Mexico’s 1995 Sudden Stop, for example, the current account 
shifted by nearly 9 percentage points of GDP, and consumption, investment and output fell by 
magnitudes that exceeded their business cycle standard deviations by almost a factor of 3. Only the Great 
Depression shows a recession with comparable magnitudes in the country’s economic history.  
The dominant paradigms of the early 1990s, International Real Business Cycle Theory (IRBC) and 
the New Open Economy Macroeconomics, were unable to explain Sudden Stops because they assume a 
perfect global credit market that allows households to smooth consumption, and firms to finance 
production and investment efficiently. For example, small open economy (SOE) models in the IRBC 
tradition predict that, when a negative, transitory shock hits total factor productivity (TFP), households 
borrow to smooth consumption, firms keep investment plans unaltered, and the current account falls 
slightly. If the shock has some persistence, households borrow less and adjust consumption more, and 
firms cut investment and production, resulting in regular, countercyclical current account fluctuations. 
Indeed, SOE-IRBC models proved quite good at mimicking the business cycles of industrial economies. 
Sudden Stops are strikingly different. At the time that output experiences Great-Depression-size 
declines, the current account takes an abrupt jump up and domestic absorption plummets. Just when the 
dominant paradigms predict that agents need capital markets the most, agents cannot borrow at all. 
A growing literature aiming to explain Sudden Stops emerged in recent years. The starting point of 
this literature is to replace the assumption of perfect credit markets with plausible financial frictions. 
Despite important progress in theoretical work, three key issues are still unresolved: 
(a) Sudden Stops are modeled as large, unexpected shocks. In most Sudden Stop models (for example, 
Guillermo A. Calvo (1998), V.V. Chari et al. (2005)), current account reversals are a surprise –a large, 
sudden exogenous shock to foreign borrowing. This assumption has several unappealing implications: 
First, the defining feature of Sudden Stops (the abrupt current account reversal) remains unexplained. 
Second, agents are not allowed to make optimal plans considering the probability that Sudden Stops may 
occur. Third, we cannot tell whether the predictions of particular models are robust to changes allowing 
agents to act on expectations of Sudden Stops. Precautionary savings theory suggests that this can be a 
flaw because, when faced with possible catastrophic events, agents build a buffer stock of savings to lower 
the long-run probability of these outcomes. 
(b) Sudden Stop models cannot explain the output collapse in the initial stages of a Sudden Stop. Most 
existing models consider financial frictions affecting consumption and/or investment, which affect output 
after the initial current account reversal. Moreover, growth accounting exercises (Raphael Bergoeing et al. 
(2002) and Enrique G. Mendoza (2005a)) show that capital and labor account for a small fraction of the 
initial output collapse, so even if the models could mimic observed investment collapses, they would not 
explain the output collapse. We should not conclude from this, however, that Sudden Stops are driven by 
TFP shocks unrelated to financial frictions, because there can be endogenous financial links between 
measured TFP (e.g. Solow residuals) and Sudden Stops. In particular, Sudden Stops feature large swings 
in imported input prices and capacity utilization (see David Cook and Michael B. Devereux (2006) and 
Mendoza (2005a)), and swings like these are easy to misrepresent as true TFP changes in standard 
estimates of Solow residuals (see Mary G. Finn (1995)).  
(c) The quantitative relevance of financial mechanisms driving Sudden Stop models is largely unknown. 
Narayana Kocherlakota (2000) casts doubt on the ability of credit constraints to yield sizable asymmetry,   
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amplification and persistence in the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to adverse shocks. Moreover, 
because of the scarcity of quantitative findings, we cannot tell whether a financial friction with reasonable 
Sudden Stop features can produce Sudden Stops as infrequent events nested within typical fluctuations, as 
observed in the data. The structure of emerging economies does not change abruptly when they hit a 
Sudden Stop, so a theory that could explain Sudden Stops by introducing frictions that result in 
unrealistic business cycles would not be very helpful. It is equally important to distinguish mechanisms 
that enlarge “typical” business cycle variability from mechanisms that create Sudden Stops. Chari et. al 
(2005) mix the two in referring to Pablo A. Neumeyer and Fabrizio Perri’s (2005) model of large business 
cycles driven by large interest rate shocks as a model of Sudden Stops. Sudden Stops are not observable 
in standard business cycle moments because unusually large recessions are, by definition, swamped by 
typical cycles. 
This paper reports results for a class of equilibrium models with credit constraints that aim to make 
progress in addressing the above problems. The two key features common to these models are that: 
whether the credit constraints bind is an endogenous equilibrium outcome, and when they bind, they set 
in motion Irving Fisher’s (1933) debt-deflation mechanism. This mechanism induces nonlinear feedback 
between a country’s access to credit and the prices and allocations of goods and assets on which debt is 
leveraged. Several theoretical articles in the Sudden Stops literature study models with the debt-deflation 
mechanism (see Cristina Arellano and Mendoza (2003) for a limited survey). The contribution of the 
models reviewed here is the quantitative analysis of this mechanism in a dynamic, stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) framework.  
The quantitative debt-deflation models of Sudden Stops yield three key lessons: 
(1) Sudden Stops emerge endogenously without large, unexpected shocks. They are an endogenous 
outcome in environments in which agents plan their actions taking credit constraints and expectations of 
Sudden Stops into account. A Sudden Stop is an equilibrium response to typical realizations of adverse 
shocks to fundamentals (e.g. world interest rates, the terms of trade, or TFP) when agents are highly 
indebted. In turn, these high-debt states are reached with positive probability in the long run as a result 
of the equilibrium dynamics of the economy. 
(2) Collateral constraints do cause output declines during Sudden Stops. Output falls on impact when a 
Sudden Stop begins if credit constraints limit access to working capital, or if the debt-deflation 
mechanism lowers the value of the marginal product of factors of production. In addition, contrary to the 
findings of Chari et al. (2005), output does fall after an initial current account reversal in the presence of 
endogenous collateral constraints that limit debt to a fraction of the market value of physical capital.   
(3) The quantitative effects of the debt-deflation mechanism are important. This mechanism yields 
significant amplification and asymmetry in the responses of macro variables to standard shocks. In 
addition, Sudden Stops are infrequent events nested within regular business cycles. If the credit 
constraints do not bind, the economy responds to adverse shocks as SOE-DSGE models predict. 
Precautionary saving rules out the largest Sudden Stops from the stochastic stationary state, but Sudden 
Stops remain a positive-probability event even though their effect on business cycle statistics is negligible.  
I. Debt-Deflation Models of Business Cycles and Sudden Stops 
The models are based on Mendoza’s (1991) SOE-IRBC framework, which is not described in detail 
due to space constraints, but replacing the assumption of perfect credit markets with borrowing 
constraints. The models represent the decentralized competitive equilibrium of economies where the 
agents’ ability to borrow in a world market of one-period bonds (b) is limited to a fraction κ of the market 
value of the income or assets offered as collateral: 
  ( ) 11 , ,, , , 0 tt t t t t bg p y k k b κκ ++ ≥− ≥  (1)   
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The collateral function g(⋅) depends on a vector of market prices p (for goods, factors, or assets), on 
income, y, on asset holdings, k, and on existing debt. This setup includes a wide variety of borrowing 
limits. At the extremes, κ=0 represents a no-borrowing constraint and κ=∞ is the perfect-credit-markets 
case. When g(⋅) is a constant, the constraint is an ad-hoc debt limit. The case with g(⋅)=qtαt+1k, where qt 
is the price of equity and αt+1 are equity shares, is Rao Aiyagari and Mark Gertler’s (1999) margin 
constraint. Kocherlakota (2000) examined the constraint g(⋅)=qtk, with k as a factor in inelastic supply 





N are incomes from tradables and nontradables 
respectively and p
N is the relative price of nontradables, is the liability dollarization credit constraint 
(foreign debt is in units of tradables but leveraged in part on nontradables income). The price of 
nontradables is endogenous and a drop in p
N (i.e., a real depreciation) can trigger the constraint. 
On the side of firms, the credit constraint (1) can represent a limit on the firms’ access to working 
capital. For instance, bt+1 can represent working capital loans and g(⋅) could be the firms’ sales (as if these 
loans were trade credits guaranteed by sales) or the market value of the firms’ physical assets. Constraints 
of this type produce a credit transmission channel that links the loss of access to world credit with an 
immediate drop in output, as Section II explains.   
A. Distortions Induced by Credit Constraints in Debt Deflation Models 
Constraints in the family defined in (1) introduce distortions akin to endogenous financing premia. In 
general, the consumption Euler equation of models with these constraints can be written as: 
  [ ] 1 tt t t ER λλ µ + =+  (2) 
where λt is the lifetime marginal utility of date-t consumption (i.e. the Lagrange multiplier on the budget 
constraint), µt is the Lagrange multiplier on the credit constraint, and R is the world-determined real 
interest rate (assumed to be time-invariant for simplicity). Defining the households’ intertemporal relative 
price of consumption as [ ] 11
h
tt t t RE λλ ++ ≡ , it follows that, when (1) binds, households face the following 
endogenous financing premium: 
  [ ] 11
h
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In models that allow for asset accumulation, this premium alters excess asset returns as follows: 
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t+1 is the return on assets. Thus, a binding credit constraint has a direct effect that increases the 
equity premium by the fraction (1-κ) of the hike in the financing premium. This effect is limited to the 
fraction (1-κ) because, on the margin, agents can relax their credit constraint by holding more assets, 
with the marginal increase in “debt capacity” given by κ.
1 A binding credit constraint also induces the 
Heaton-Lucas indirect effect because the constraint hampers the ability of agents to smooth consumption, 
and hence makes the covariance between marginal utility and asset returns “more negative,” thereby 
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where d represents dividends. Expressions (4) and (5) show that a credit constraint that binds at present, 
or is expected to bind at any point in the future, increases excess returns and lowers asset prices bid by 
the agents facing the constraint. As Section II explains, however, this is necessary but not sufficient for 
equilibrium asset prices to fall when the credit constraints bind. 
In models in which firms can hit limits on working capital, firms face a financing premium that 
increases effective factor costs when the limit binds. If, for example, working capital financing is available 
up to a fraction κ
f of the value of the firms’ assets at the end of the production period, the optimality 
condition for the demand for factor nj for which a fraction φ of the cost is paid with credit is:   
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  [ ] () 1 ( )
j
p A
tn t t t FN p r R εε φ χ =+ +  (6) 
()
j nt FNis the marginal product of nj in a production function F(N) that uses a vector of inputs N, r is the 
net interest rate on working capital (i.e., R-1),  χt is the Lagrange multiplier on the working capital 
constraint, and ε
A and ε
P are shocks to TFP and the market price of nj. If χt=0, condition (6) reduces to 
the optimality condition of SOE-IRBC models with the standard working capital setup (e.g. Neumeyer 
and Perri (2005)). P. Marcelo Oviedo (2005) showed that these models require interest rate processes with 
high mean and variance for working capital to make a difference. In contrast, when the limit on working 
capital binds, the marginal cost of nj rises because the effective financing cost of working capital goes up 
by χtR. This endogenous financing premium amplifies the responses of factor demands to shocks, and this 
mechanism can be triggered by shocks to TFP or factor prices, even with a constant interest rate. 
Moreover, if the amplified factor demand responses make asset prices fall, the debt-deflation mechanism is 
set in motion because the fall in the value of the collateral tightens further the limit on working capital. 
The credit constraints examined here are endogenous because they respond to equilibrium prices and 
allocations (as in Macroeconomics literature on credit constraints by Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore 
(1997), Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) or Kocherlakota (2000)), but they are not modeled as outcomes of 
optimal credit contracts. Still, the above financing premia represent endogenous premia, varying across 
time and states depending on whether the credit constraints bind and on how binding they are, which 
foreign lenders could charge so that borrowers find it optimal to respect the credit constraints in a credit 
market where the constraints are not imposed directly.
2 The justification for this could be that, for 
example, limited enforcement prevents lenders from recovering more than κ or κ
f of the market value of a 
debtor’s assets in case of non-repayment.  
B.  Amplification, Sudden Stops & Debt Deflations: A Liability Dollarization Example 
The endogenous, nonlinear feedback between price deflation and debt access sets the debt-deflation 
mechanism apart from other credit constraints studied in the Sudden Stops literature. This point can be 
illustrated with an example based on a simple deterministic, two-sector model. The model features a time-
invariant endowment of nontradables and a sequence of tradables endowment tilted towards the future 
(so that agents wish to borrow at present).
3 With standard stationarity assumptions and perfect credit 
markets, the equilibrium of this economy is a textbook example of Permament Income theory: tradables 
consumption is perfectly smooth, nontradables consumption and the relative price of nontradables are 
constant, and the current account moves to keep tradables consumption as a constant fraction of wealth 
(with wealth equal to the present value of the tradables endowment). Add now the liability dollarization 
credit constraint bt+1 ≥ -κ(yt
T+pt
Nyt
N), and hit the economy with wealth-neutral shocks that reduce y0
T and 
increase y1
T. As long as the credit constraint does not bind, the equilibrium with perfect credit markets is 
preserved. There is, however, a critical value of y0
T low enough for the constraint to bind, and below this 
value the frictionless equilibrium is no longer attainable. 
Figure 1 illustrates the date-0 equilibrium of this debt-deflation model. The equilibrium with the 
credit constraint binding must satisfy two conditions: First, the resource constraint for tradables with 
debt set at the borrowing limit must hold (which is the case along the SS line — notice that SS shifts 
horizontally to the left as y0
T falls). Second, p0
N must equal the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption of tradables and nontradables. This condition is represented by the PP curve. The line TT 
represents tradables consumption with perfect credit markets (or when the credit constraint does not 
bind), which is independent of the price of nontradables. TT and PP intersect at the equilibrium with 
perfect credit markets (point A). The curve SS is drawn for the critical value of y0
T at which the 
constraint begins to bind, so SS intersects TT and PP at point A.  
Assume that y0
T falls below its critical level causing SS to shift to SS′. The new equilibrium is   
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determined at point D, and the change from A to D can be broken down into three moves. First, if 
prices were sticky and the borrowing constraint were set as an ad-hoc debt limit, the new equilibrium 
would be at point B. At B, however, tradables consumption is lower than in the perfect credit markets 
case and equilibrium requires p0
N to fall. Thus, the second move, from B to C, reflects the pure balance 
sheet effect of liability dollarization (as in Calvo (1998)). If the credit constraint were independent of the 
nontradables price (i.e., without debt deflation), C would be the new equilibrium, with a lower 
nontradables price and lower tradables consumption. But at C the debt deflation has yet to take place. 
Hence, the third move, from C to D, occurs because the lower price at C tightens the credit constraint by 
lowering the value of the nontradables endowment. This forces tradables consumption to fall so as to 
satisfy the constraint at a point in SS′, but at that point p0
N falls again to re-attain a point along PP, but 
at that point tradables consumption falls again because the credit constraint tightens further. This debt-
deflation process continues until it converges to point D. In short, the response to the shock hitting y0
T is 
amplified because of the combined balance sheet and debt-deflation effects. 
Two important observations about the Sudden Stop equilibrium: First, the abrupt current account 
reversal (i.e., the amplification of the response of the current account form C to D) is an endogenous 
outcome, not an assumption. Second, the Sudden Stop occurs even with fully flexible prices and is not 
driven by a self-fulfilling shift across multiple equilibria. 
Mendoza (2005b) conducts some numerical experiments with this basic model using parameter values 
set to match roughly key features of emerging economies, particularly the elasticity of substitution 
between consumption of tradables and nontradables. This elasticity is crucial because it determines the 
response of p
N to a given contraction in tradables consumption. The results show that the debt-deflation 
mechanism generates substantial amplification that dwarfs the balance sheet effect. For example, setting 
κ=0.34, a 5-percent wealth-neutral shock to y0
T reduces the debt position by 15 percentage points of 
permanent income, and makes tradables consumption and p0
N fall to levels nearly 60 percent below those 
of the equilibrium with perfect credit markets. The debt-deflation mechanism contributes all but 3 
percentage points of these declines in consumption and the price of nontradables. 
II. The Quantitative Lessons 
A. Liability Dollarization in a DSGE Model 
Mendoza (2002) examines a DSGE model with the liability dollarization credit constraint that 
considers production of nontradables with labor demand and supply. The credit constraint limits 
households’ tradables-denominated debt to a fraction of their income, as is standard practice in household 
debt markets (where lenders use scoring algorithms to set ceilings on debt-income ratios). With a Cobb-




Agents know that this constraint is a feature of the credit market and they take it into account in 
formulating their optimal plans. If the economy’s debt is sufficiently large, the credit constraint binds as 
an endogenous equilibrium response to adverse one-standard-deviation (1SD) shocks to TFP, R, and an 
inflation-equivalent consumption tax. In these Sudden Stops output falls on impact because the collapse 
in p
N lowers the value of the marginal product of labor, and hence labor demand.  
Simulations based on a calibration to Mexican data show that the impact effects of 1SD shocks are 
amplified significantly during Sudden Stops. Comparing with the responses under perfect credit markets, 
the current account reversal is 5 percentage points of GDP larger, consumption and nontradables output 
fall 10 percentage points more, and the price of nontradables falls 8 percentage points more. However, 
agents build a large stock of precautionary savings, worth about 35 percent of GDP in terms of the mean 
of b, and with this “war chest” the long-run probability of binding credit constraints is only 0.33 percent.  
The debt-deflation mechanism induces offsetting supply-side effects in this model. On one hand, labor 
demand falls because the value of the marginal product of labor falls with the price of nontradables. On   
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the other hand, the marginal gain of labor supply rises because extra labor income allows agents to 
borrow more. If labor supply is sufficiently elastic, this second effect can dominate at very high debt levels 
(i.e., with a very tight credit constraint), but, because of precautionary savings, these states have zero 
long-run probability. 
B. Debt-Deflation Mechanics in Global Asset Trading 
The debt-deflation spiral can affect asset prices if collateral constraints affecting some agents coexist 
with trading frictions that produce a less-than-infinitely-elastic demand for assets from other agents. In 
this case, agents that hit collateral constraints and fire-sale assets in efforts to “meet margin calls,” trade 
with agents that have downward-slopping asset demand curves. Asset prices therefore fall, and as they do 
the collateral constraint tightens further, setting the debt-deflation mechanism in motion (and magnifying 
the direct and indirect asset pricing effects of collateral constraints). If the agents fire-selling assets could 
trade in a frictionless, competitive market, in which market demand is infinitely elastic at the 
fundamentals price q
f
t (i.e., the expected present value of dividends discounted at the world interest rate), 
asset prices could not fall and the debt-deflation mechanism could not function. 
Mendoza and Smith (2006) model the asset trading friction as trading costs incurred by foreign 
securities firms, which may include conventional trading costs as well as costs due to informational, 
institutional or other intangible frictions. Mendoza and Smith study a two-agent equilibrium asset pricing 
setup in which domestic agents face the Aiyagari-Gertler margin constraint bt+1  ≥-κqtαt+1k. Explicit 
lending on margin takes place mainly amongst investors in securities markets, and regulators also impose 
statutory margin requirements. In addition, widely-used risk management tools (e.g. value-at-risk 
collateralization) operate as implicit margin requirements by making creditors sell assets and cut credit 
when systemic shocks increase market volatility, resulting in even higher volatility and further asset sales. 





q αα θ + − + , where a is a trading cost 
coefficient and θ represents costs paid regardless of trading activity. This setup produces a closed-form 




tt t t aq q αα θ + ⎡ ⎤ − = −− ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ . Thus, the foreign 
traders’ demand elasticity with respect to the percent deviation of q
f
t from qt is 1/a. 
Mendoza and Smith calibrate the model to Mexican data and show that it can produce Sudden Stops 
as endogenous responses to 1SD productivity shocks when: (a) agents are sufficiently leveraged (i.e., when 
-bt/qtαtk is sufficiently high), and (b) the asset market is relatively liquid (i.e., when short-selling limits are 
not binding).
4 The ability of the model to yield asset price collapses hinges, however, on the foreign 
traders’ demand being sufficiently inelastic. 
Figure 2 shows the model’s conditional impulse responses (i.e., conditional forecast functions of the 
nonlinear equilibrium Markov processes) to a 1SD, negative TFP shock when a Sudden Stop occurs. The 
Figure shows simulations for an elasticity of 0.5 in the demand of foreign traders. Relative to the outcome 
with perfect credit markets, consumption collapses 8 percentage points more, the current account 
increases by 6 percentage points of GDP more, and asset prices decline by 8 percentage points more. 
Thus, the debt-deflation mechanism induces significant amplification effects. Moreover, the effects on 
consumption and the current account persist for several periods. 
The size of the trading costs predicted by the model can be assessed by examining total trading costs 
in percent of equity returns. Trading costs are negligible, at less than 1/5 of a percent of returns, when 
the collateral constraint does not bind, but they rise rapidly as the leverage ratio rises inside the Sudden 
Stop region (i.e., in the region of the state space where the constraint binds), peaking at about 6.4 percent 
of returns. Mendoza and Smith (2006) document findings from the finance literature suggesting that costs 
of this magnitude are in line with empirical evidence.  
C. The Debt-Deflation Mechanism in an Equilibrium Business Cycle Model   
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The models reviewed in A. and B. are incomplete business cycle models because they abstract from 
capital accumulation and make strong simplifying assumptions about the supply-side of the economy (in 
Mendoza and Smith (2006), for example, output is unaffected by credit frictions and responds to TFP 
shocks just like in a frictionless economy). Mendoza (2005a) examines a business cycle model with the 
collateral constraint bt+1 ≥-κqtkt+1 and a constraint limiting working capital financing to the fraction κ
f of 
sales. Chari et al. (2005) claim that these are subtle constraints for which there is little direct evidence. 
Firm-level data show, however, that corporate leverage ratios rise sharply in the run up to Sudden Stops, 
and collapse abruptly in the aftermath (see Figure 3). There are also extensive accounts of the role played 
by highly leveraged agents in these events (in the famous case of the Russian crisis, massive margin calls 
on these agents reached even U.S. capital markets and led the Federal Reserve to lower interest rates). 
In Mendoza (2005a), firms use working capital to pay for a fraction φ of the cost of imported inputs, 
for which they pay a world-determined price, and for costs of capacity utilization. Firms also face capital 
adjustment costs, so they feature a demand for investment (or supply of equity) that rises with the price 
of capital (i.e., Tobin’s Q). This is the trading friction that makes agents fire-selling equity interact with 
agents that buy equity only if the price falls. When Tobin’s Q falls as a result of the debt-deflation 
mechanism, it brings down investment, and with it future capital, output and wealth. 
Mendoza (2005a) calibrates the model to quarterly Mexican data for the period 1993:1-2004:4. The 
model includes shocks to R (the real rate on 90-day U.S. T-bills), shocks to the relative price of imported 
inputs, and TFP shocks. The latter are estimated using a production function for gross output that 
includes imported inputs and variable capital utilization, so as to correct for the bias affecting Solow 
residuals. Agents form their expectations using the stochastic process for these shocks taken from the 
data, without any large, unexpected shocks. 
The results show that the key findings of the other debt-deflation models extend to the business cycle 
model: The debt-deflation mechanism is a powerful vehicle for inducing amplification, asymmetry and 
persistence in the response of real variables to exogenous shocks of “typical” size. Sudden Stops occur 
when households and firms have debts large enough for the credit constraints to bind, and these high-debt 
states are reached with positive probability in the stochastic stationary state. Precautionary saving rules 
out the “largest” Sudden Stops and results in a long-run probability of binding collateral constraints of 
1.7 percent (low but significantly higher than in the liability dollarization and asset trading economies) 
Sudden Stops occur in the model even if the limit on working capital never binds. Starting from a 
positive-probability Sudden Stop state where the collateral constraint binds and with κ
f high enough so 
that χt=0 always, the model predicts the following impact effects relative to the economy with perfect 
credit markets: an excess current account reversal of 6 percentage points of GDP, and excess drop in 
consumption of 2 percentage points and an excess investment collapse of 24 percentage points. Asset 
prices decline only by an excess of 0.5 percent, which is much less than in the data, but still implies 
substantial amplification relative to the frictionless case (where equity prices hardly move). Output begins 
to fall one period after the current account reversal, as the impact effect on investment begins to hit 
installed capital, and it falls by an excess of up to 2 percentage points four periods later. The Sudden 
Stops on investment, Tobin’s Q and the current account are short-lived, but those affecting output, 
consumption, and labor are persistent. 
Introducing a binding limit on working capital improves the above results by producing an excess 
output decline on impact as the Sudden Stop begins. The decline cannot account for the full magnitude of 
initial output collapses of actual Sudden Stops because of two limitations of the working capital constraint 
linked to sales. First, this constraint induces offsetting effects on factor demands: On one hand, the 
financing premium in (6) increases effective factor costs. On the other hand, the effective marginal benefit 
of employing these factors increases when the working capital constraint binds because increased factor   
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demands support higher output and sales, and the latter increases the firms’ ability to borrow. Second, 
the Cobb-Douglas production function reduces the effectiveness of the working capital constraint because 
the ratio of sales (i.e., output) to factor payments is unaffected by shocks to TFP or input prices, and 
thus is only affected by interest rate shocks. Since only a fraction of factor costs is paid with credit, and 
only the small interest-rate shocks reflected in the U.S. real interest rate are considered, the findings from 
Oviedo (2005) apply: interest rate shocks have small effects on factor demands. The effects are larger than 
he found because of the endogenous risk premium operating when the limit on working capital binds, but 
they are small compared to what is needed to explain the initial decline in output of a Sudden Stop.  
III. Further Research & Policy Lessons 
Research in quantitative models of Sudden Stops is at an early stage and needs to move in several 
directions. A revision in progress of Mendoza (2005a) addresses the shortcomings of the sales-linked limit 
on working capital by linking it to the value of the firm’s assets instead (see eq. (6)). This change also 
adds a new feedback channel for the debt-deflation process, since the fall in Tobin’s Q now tightens the 
working capital constraint. The Tobin Q setup has limitations, however, because the results reviewed here 
suggest that it may not be able to account simultaneously for the asset price crashes and the investment 
collapses of Sudden Stops: the high adjustment costs that may produce the former would yield small 
investment declines. On a different vein, it would be interesting to explore the quantitative significance of 
the debt-deflation mechanism at work with the liability dollarization credit constraint in a full-blown 
equilibrium business cycle model. Beyond debt-deflation models, other financial frictions are producing 
important quantitative findings in terms of their ability to produce Sudden Stops that suggest promising 
areas for further research. These include search frictions in foreign investment (Guita Gopinath (2004)), 
the interaction of transactions costs in goods and asset markets (Philippe Martin and Helene Rey (2006)), 
and signal extraction frictions in asset markets with imperfectly informed agents  (Emine Boz (2006)). 
Debt-deflation models of Sudden Stops also have important policy lessons that are fertile ground for 
further research. Since debt-deflation effects are significant, it seems natural to conclude that policies 
aimed at preventing deflation are a good option. Fisher (1933) himself made this argument, and Calvo’s 
(2002) proposal to provide price guarantees on the emerging markets asset class is in a similar vein. His 
and other recent proposals for managing Sudden Stops by containing large deviations of asset prices below 
their fundamentals levels can be examined using the framework described in this paper. For example, C. 
Bora Durdu and Mendoza (2006) explore the implications of price guarantees in the debt-deflation model 
of Mendoza and Smith (2006). The guarantees introduce a moral-hazard-like distortion that leads foreign 
traders to “overinvest” and domestic agents to “overborrow.” With precise knowledge of the data, the 
model yields a state-contingent schedule of guarantees for which the benefit of undoing the distortions 
that cause Sudden Stops exceeds the costs of the moral hazard distortion. Yet, whether we have such 
knowledge of the data, and whether the model is a sufficiently accurate representation of reality to use it 
for implementing the price guarantees system, are still open questions. 
The indexation of debt to GDP or to the relative prices relevant for liability dollarization, and the 
adoption of hard currencies to replace domestic currencies, have also been proposed as remedies for 
Sudden Stops, and some countries have adopted them (e.g., Argentina’s GDP-linked debt or El Salvador’s 
adoption of the dollar). However, their effectiveness at preventing Sudden Stops is yet to be tested. 
If “creative” new policies seem risky, the debt-deflation models provide their own remedy: build a 
“war chest” of foreign exchange reserves to minimize the long-run probability of Sudden Stops. This Neo-
merchantilist strategy has its problems, because holding reserves is costly and in the short-run building 
them up can imply a costly sacrifice (as Ricardo Caballero and Stavros Panageas (2005) showed). On the 
other hand, this is the strategy many emerging economies are following, and if the alternative is to be 
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1 This effect does not imply that agents will increase investment at equilibrium, instead of reducing it, because their 
goal is to reallocate resources to the present so as to reduce the effect of the credit constraint on consumption, and 
increasing investment moves resources in the opposite direction. 
2 Lenders would find these financing premia optimal if they are extremely averse to non-repayment states as an agent 
with CRRA preferences, rather than being risk-neutral. 
3 Mendoza (2005b) provides a formal mathematical treatment of this setup. 
4 Since precautionary saving moves the long-run averages of debt and equity away from the “cliff’s edge” where these 
conditions hold, Sudden Stops occur far from the means of the stochastic steady state. This implies that the model’s 
business cycle moments are unaffected by Sudden Stops, and that Sudden Stops cannot be studied as features of near-
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Figure 2. Sudden Stop Dynamics in Mendoza-Smith Model with Foreign Demand Elasticity of 1/2
(percent deviations relative to economy with perfect credit markets)
Note: Forecast functions conditional on a negative, one-standard-deviation productivity shock
and a leverage ratio of 12.2%  at date 1 (see Mendoza and Smith (2006) for details) .Figure 3. Leverage Ratios of Listed Corporations in South East Asia



















debt to market value of equity 
(right axis)
Note: Cross-country arithmetic average of median leverage ratios across all publicly listed corporations in 
each country. Data from Worldscope database.
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